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I have always been among those who believed that the greatest freedom of
speech was the greatest safety, because if a man is a fool the best thing to do is
to encourage him to advertise the fact by speaking.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Teachers have a new beast to tame-cyberbullies. With cell
phones in every pocket and Internet access in every classroom,2 edu-
1. President Woodrow Wilson, Address at the Institute of France, Paris (May 10,
1919), in 2 SELECTED LITERARY AND POLITICAL PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF WOOD-
ROW WILSON 333 (1926).
2. See, e.g., Elizabeth Stuart, Law Doesn't Help Teachers in Dealing with Cyberbul-
lies, DESERET NEWS, June 15, 2008, at A01, available at http://www.deseretnews.
com/article/1,5143,700234842,00.html.
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cators must find a way to maintain classroom decorum and facilitate
an environment pursuant to which all students are still allowed to
learn. Unfortunately for some, their academic environment is littered
with verbal landmines planted on the Internet or cell phones by disre-
spectful students. This harassment, often referred to as cyberbully-
ing,3 interferes with targeted students' education and the rights of
teachers. Notwithstanding such interference, courts have routinely
overturned decisions by educators to discipline cyberbullies at school,
often citing the First Amendment as the reason a student cannot be
disciplined for speech that originates "off campus."4
The Constitution does not shield cyberbullies from school disci-
pline. When school authorities seek to curb the effects of cyberbully-
ing-especially as it invades the school environment and interferes
with the rights of students, teachers, or administrators who may be
the target of such efforts-the cyberbully often seeks refuge behind
the First Amendment. 5 At least one scholar has aptly recognized that,
because of the relationship between the targets and the website cre-
ators, courts must allow schools to address the stigmatizing and pub-
licly humiliating problem of cyberbullying and Internet harassment,
which may originate outside of the school per se but carries its sting
into the classroom.6 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District7 and its progeny support school discipline in those in-
stances where, as in many,8 students embark upon a cyberbullying
3. See infra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa.
2007) (finding insufficient "nexus" between off-campus website and the "buzz" or
discussions present after the creation of student's Myspace profile); Emmett v.
Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting
that although the intended audience was "undoubtedly connected to" the high
school attended by plaintiff, the speech was entirely "outside of the school's su-
pervision or control" because it "was not produced in connection with any class or
school project"); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting almost immediately in the factual
background of opinion that an Internet website with uncomplimentary remarks
about some educators was created outside of the school, on home computer, not
using school resources, and that student located the program on his own to create
the website).
5. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Latour v. Riverside
Beaver Sch. Dist., No. Civ. A. 05-1076, 2005 WL 2106562 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24,
2005); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich.
2002); Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088; J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch.
Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
6. See Renee L. Servance, Comment, Cyberbullying, Cyber-Harassment, and the
Conflict Between Schools and the First Amendment, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 1213, 1238
(2003).
7. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
8. See Todd D. Erb, Note, A Case For Strengthening School District Jurisdiction To
Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARiz. ST. L.J. 257, 274 (2008)
(recognizing that "[b]ullies naturally pick on weak individuals rather than large
[Vol. 87:630
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endeavor off campus, the substance of which subsequently invades
campus sometimes pushing other students to devastating measures. 9
In these cases, cyberbullies should not be allowed to avail themselves
of protection provided to some speech by the First Amendment.
This Article suggests that the analytical framework prescribed by
Tinker and its progeny affords school authorities broad discretion and
sufficient guidance in fashioning school discipline when student
speech is involved. Part II provides a brief explanation of the rela-
tively new phenomena through which cyberbullies disrupt the school
environment and the lives of those in it. Part III then provides a brief
discussion of Tinker's balancing framework, followed in Part IV by a
discussion of the rights of others-usually targets of cyberbullying
such as fellow students and teachers who attend or teach at the same
school as the cyberbully-which Tinker expressly provides must be
considered as part of the analysis as to what protection, if any, the
First Amendment provides to cyberbullying that invades the school-
house. Part V then explains that, as part of a proper analysis, courts
must account for the fact that educators are in a better position to
make immediate decisions as to whether a cyberbully's website or blog
has disrupted the school environment or is reasonably likely to do so.
Serious consideration must also be given to the cyberbully's intent
that his speech "sneak" into the school and to the effects that such
speech has upon its targets and their respective rights once it is be-
hind the schoolhouse gate. Tinker prescribes that all of these rights
and competing considerations be balanced, but courts sometimes
avoid conducting this analysis, instead overstating the importance of
where the speech originated prior to its injection into the school envi-
ronment.1 0 When all of the competing rights and interests are appro-
priately considered, the Article concludes with the assertion that
cyberbullies should not be permitted to avoid school discipline in the
name of the First Amendment.
numbers of students" and that "[t]he effects of bullying may be excruciating to
bear for that individual, but the rest of the student body may not even know
about the bullying, much less feel its effects").
9. See, e.g., Joan Whitely, When Teasing Isn't Funny: The Cost of Bullying, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj home/2005/Oct-
31-Mon-2005/living/4038822.html (discussing teen suicides attributable, at least
in part, to cyberbullying).
10. See, e.g., Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discuss-
ing how Tinker transformed what was originally off-campus speech into on-cam-
pus speech because students accessed the website at school); Killion v. Franklin
Reg'l. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Emmett, 92 F. Supp.
2d 1088, 1089-90; Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-LV Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (conducting an analysis under Tinker
because several individuals had accessed the website at school).
2009]
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II. SAME DEFENSE, NEW OPPONENT: EDUCATORS
ARE REQUIRED TO APPLY AN AGED FRAMEWORK TO
NEW DISCIPLINARY SCENARIOS, SUCH AS THOSE
PRESENTED BY CYBERBULLYING
Educators must be afforded the ability to preserve the educational
environment in our public schools, notwithstanding new technologies
readily available to students. Education is one of the most important
components in the development of a young person's character. "In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.""1 A
well-rounded education is unquestionably "a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later pro-
fessional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his envi-
ronment,"12 an important part of which requires educators to
"inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values.., conducive to
happiness ... ."13 Along these lines, the United States Supreme Court
has "repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools."14 In today's world, this process requires that educators
not only keep up with students, but also that they keep up with tech-
nology. Simply put, the "'Internet is the new bathroom wall'-the vir-
tual place kids scrawl something when they want to be mean."15
A. Cyberbullying Provides Students with a Relatively New,
Previously Untested and Undisciplined Mechanism
for Disrupting the Lives of Fellow Students and
Educators
Cyberspace is now a part of any young person's identity.16 Educa-
tors and parents alike are scrambling to catch up with young people
whose online socializing includes playing pranks and seeking re-
venge.17 On the playground, such pranks and revenge are classified
as "bullying."1s Since those initial utterances and pranks now take
11. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
12. Id.
13. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting CHARLES A.
BEARD ET AL., THE BEARDS' NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228
(1968)).
14. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
15. Sharon Noguchie, Cyberbullies A Growing Problem at School, SAN JOSE MERCURY
NEWS, Jan. 13, 2008, at lB.
16. Adam Shull, Battling Invisible Bullies: Internet Gives Tormentors New Venue To
Launch Their Assaults, THE PADUCAH SUN, July 2, 2008, at 1A.
17. Noguchie, supra note 15, at lB.
18. Bullying has been defined as "behavior where 'one or more individuals inflict
physical, verbal, or emotional abuse on another.'.. . This behavior is not harm-
634 [Vol. 87:630
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place off of the playground, often in the form of an Internet website or
chat room not immediately subject to the jurisdiction of any school
discipline policy, they create relatively new issues for educators, i.e.,
what happens when "off-campus" speech has detrimental effects "on
campus"? Some courts have attempted to answer this question, and in
doing so, they overemphasize the geographic location where the
speech originated en route to incorrectly concluding that such "off-
campus" speech cannot be the subject of school discipline.19 This re-
sult is not dictated by the Supreme Court's First Amendment juris-
prudence and is based upon the fallacy of overemphasizing the
location of the "initial utterance," simultaneously ignoring Tinker's
prescription that disruption within the school be considered when de-
ciding the constitutionality of school discipline.
Bullying itself is nothing new; what is new is the technology. 20
The interaction between bullying and technology has given rise to a
whole new form of bullying, often referred to as "cyberbullying."2 1
Cyberbullying can be generally defined as using the Internet, cell
phones, e-mails, text messaging, online chat rooms, and other forms of
electronic communication to deliberately harass, mock, defame, intim-
idate or threaten someone.22 A relatively new form of social aggres-
sion 2 3 that provides a perception of invisibility, 24 cyberbullying
less teasing. Rather it is pervasive and prolonged abusive behavior whereby the
bully takes pleasure in the distress of the victim and also derives power over the
victim by inflicting abuse." Servance, supra note 6, at 1216 (quoting SUELLEN
FRIED & PAULA FRIED, BULLIES AND VICTIMS 5 (1996)).
19. See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa.
2007); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa.
2001) (noting that although the intended audience was "undoubtedly connected
to" the high school attended by plaintiff, the speech was entirely "outside of the
school's supervision or control" because it "was not produced in connection with
any class or school"); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088,
1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist.,
30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (noting almost immediately in the
factual background of opinion that Internet website with uncomplimentary re-
marks about some educators was created outside of the school, on home com-
puter, not using school resources, and that student located program on his own to
create the website).
20. Thomas J. Billitteri, How Can Cyberbullies Be Stopped?, THE NEWS & OBSERVER,
July 20, 2008, http://www.newsobserver.com/news/q/archive/story/1147610.html.
21. See Nancy Willard, Educator's Guide to Cyberbullying and Cyberthreats, CENTER
FOR SAFE AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF THE INTERNET, April 2007, 1-2, http://csriu.
org/cyberbully/docs/cbcteducator.pdf.
22. See Billitteri, supra note 20, at El; Shull, supra note 16.
23. Cyberbullying is a form of social aggression, using the Internet or other digital
technologies. It can take several forms:
" Flaming: Online "fights" using electronic messages with angry and
vulgar language.
" Harassment: Repeatedly sending offensive, rude and insulting
messages.
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encourages the arrival of new bullies-generally students who typi-
cally would not have been the aggressor in the classroom or on the
playground and who would not have brought physical harm to any-
one.25 Like bullying, cyberbullying seeps into the halls of America's
schools on a daily basis since, more often than not, the relationship
that forms the basis for the cyberbullying was formed in school.
2 6
Several states empower, and many require, school districts to es-
tablish policies that prohibit bullying by students. 27 At least fourteen
* Denigration: "Dissing" someone online. Sending or posting cruel gos-
sip or rumors about a person to damage his or her reputation or
friendship.
" Impersonation: Breaking into someone's account, posing as that per-
son and sending messages to make the person look bad, get that per-
son in trouble or danger, or damage that person's reputations or
friendships.
" Outing and trickery: Sharing someone's secrets or embarrassing in-
formation or images online; tricking someone into revealing secrets or
embarrassing information, which is then shared online.
" Exclusion: Intentionally excluding someone from an online group,
such as "buddy lists."
" Cyberstalking: Repeatedly sending messages that include threats of
harm or are highly intimidating; engaging in other online activities
that make a person afraid for his or her safety.
Willard, supra note 21, at 1-2.
24. Shull, supra note 16; see also Willard, supra note 21, at 7 ("When people use the
Internet, they perceive that they are invisible.").
25. See BETH MANKE, MindOH!, THE IMPACT OF CYBERBULLYING 1-2 (Mar. 2005),
http://mindoh.com/docs/BM Cyberbullying.pdf ("Cyberbullying is 'open' to all
children, even those who are not physically capable of bullying others face-to-
face. It is the ability to keep his or her identity unknown that allows even the
least physically intimidating children to assert dominance over others online.");
see also Noguchie, supra note 15, at 1B ("The anonymity of the Internet and its
instant and wide reach, offer temptations to mischief-even to people who nor-
mally wouldn't physically bully someone."); Shull, supra note 16 ("With the per-
ception of invisibility, new bullies arrive who wouldn't typically bring physical
harm to anyone.").
26. Servance, supra note 6, at 1214.
27. See ALASKA STAT. ANN. §§ 14.33.200-250 (West, Westlaw through Oct. 1, 2008);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-2301 (2002); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32270 (West Supp.
2008); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(X) (2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-222d (West Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (West, Westlaw
through 76 Laws 2008, ch. 421); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1006.147 (West, Westlaw
through 2008 Second Regular Session); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-145 (2005); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-917A (West, Westlaw through 2008 Second Regular Session); 105
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/10-20.14 (West 2006); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 20-33-8-0.2, 20-
33-8-13.5 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Second Regular Session); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 280.12 (West Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-8256 (West, Westlaw
through 2007 Regular Session); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.070 (West, Westlaw
through 2008 Legislation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13B (West Supp. 2008);
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. §§ 7-424-424.1 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Regular
Session); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 121A.0695 (West 2008); Miss. CODE ANN. § 37-11-20
(West 1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-267 (Cum. Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 388.132-.133 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 193-F:2-F:3 (LexisNexis
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states 28 have or soon will have statutes that allow those policies to
specifically address incidents of cyberbullying, some of which may, at
first blush, appear to school authorities to be entitled to First Amend-
ment protection.2 9 Although the United States Supreme Court has
recognized that the Internet, ubiquitous as it is, affords its users some
First Amendment protection,30 the "problem [for educators expected
to enforce those policies] lies in the area where students in the exer-
cise of First Amendment rights collide with the rules of the school au-
thorities."3 1 Nowhere is this more prevalent than in those cases
where otherwise protected speech-sometimes in the form of
cyberbullying-is transmitted at home or from the local mall or skat-
ing park, but nonetheless causes a disruption or creates a serious
probability that such a disruption will occur at school.32 Simply utter-
ing the message "off campus," however, does not guaranty immunity
from discipline. In many cases, school officials remain well within
their rights to discipline the student-speaker whose "off-campus" ut-
terances may cause disruptions to the educational process.
Supp. 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 18a:37-13-37-17 (West Supp. 2008); Ouio REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 3301.22, 3313.666 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the
127th General Assembly); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 24-100.2-.5 (West 2005);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 339.351, .353, .356 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (West,
Westlaw through 2008 Legislation); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 59-63-110-63-150 (West,
Westlaw through 2007 Regular Session); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 49-6-1014-1019
(Supp. 2005); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 25.0342, 37.151-156 (Vernon 2006 &
Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53a-11A-101-401 (West, Westlaw through 2008
Second Special Session); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 11, 1161a (2004); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 22.1-208.01, 22.1-279.3:1, 22.1-279.6 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.300.285 (West 2006); W.VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18-2C-1-6 (LexisNexis 2003).
28. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 6-18-514(a)(B), (b)(2)(B)(i) (West, Westlaw through 2008
First Executive Session); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(c) (2008); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D(a) (West, Westlaw through 76 Laws 2008, ch. 421); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1006.147(2)(c)-.147(3)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2008 Second
Regular Session); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-917A(2)(b) (West, Westlaw through
2008 Second Regular Session); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-13.3(c)(5) (West
Supp. 2008); H.B. 2758, 2007/2008 Leg., §§ 1-2, (Kan. 2008) (enacted); MD. CODE
ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1(a)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2008 Regular Session); L.B.
205, 100th Leg., 2nd. Sess. (Neb. 2008) (enacted); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18a:37-14
(West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 339.351(1) (West, Westlaw through 2008 Spe-
cial Session); R.I. GEN. LAws § 16-21-26(3) (West, Westlaw through 2008 legisla-
tion); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-63-120(1) (West, Westlaw through 2007 Regular
Session); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
29. See generally Clay Calvert, Off-Campus Speech, On-Campus Punishment: Cen-
sorship of the Emerging Internet Underground, 7 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. 243
(2001) (asserting that school administrators should be prohibited by the First
Amendment from meting out an in-school punishment against students whose
speech originates off campus, but for which remedies are available through gen-
erally applicable off campus civil law remedies).
30. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
31. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
32. Billitteri, supra note 20, at El.
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B. Although Tinker and Its Progeny May Not Have Foreseen
All of the Challenges Presented by Cyberbullying, the
Current Constitutional Framework for Analyzing
Discipline Resulting from Student Speech Is Not
Insufficient
The constitutionality of school discipline resulting from a student's
off-campus speech is by no means settled. Beginning with Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District,3 3 the United
States Supreme Court has, on several occasions, addressed students'
First Amendment rights to freedom of speech in the context of pending
discipline imposed by school authorities.3 4 Although the Court has
never established a per se rule in regard to the extent of students'
rights regarding students' speech on campus, the Court has repeat-
edly reiterated that neither students nor teachers "shed their consti-
tutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate."3 5 Tinker notwithstanding, the Court has yet to directly address
the issues presented by off-campus student Internet speech and the
accompanying boundaries of school officials' authority to regulate the
effects of that speech within and upon the school environment.
Despite what some perceive as "insufficiencies" 36 in Tinker's ana-
lytical framework, Tinker and its progeny provide a sufficient frame-
work against which discipline imposed by school authorities and
prompted, at least in part by student speech on the Internet, can and
should be analyzed. Tinker and its progeny provide an analytical
framework under which one can readily conclude that students' in-
creasing use of the Internet has not, as some commentators 37 and
33. 393 U.S. 503.
34. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 681 (1986).
35. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506; see also Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2636-37 (Alito, J., concur-
ring) (recognizing the majority's reaffirmation of Tinker's finding "that students
do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate.'"); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 844 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing Tinker's finding); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (same);
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680 (same); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180 (1972) (same).
36. See, e.g., Erb, supra note 8, at 271 n.103 (contending that Tinker and its progeny
may be "ill-suited" to deal with off-campus expression and its permeation
throughout the schoolhouse).
37. See, e.g., Kyle W. Brenton, Note, BONGHiTS4JESUS.COM? Scrutinizing Public
School Authority Over Student Cyberspeech Through The Lens Of Personal Juris-
diction, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1206 (2008); Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline
for Creating Uncensored Anonymous Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMErrE L. REV. 93
(2003); Calvert, supra note 29, at 275; see also Christi Cassel, Note, Keep Out Of
Myspace!: Protecting Students From Unconstitutional Suspensions And Expul-
sions, 49 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 643, 646 (2007) (suggesting that school officials
"frequently overstep [I constitutional boundaries" when imposing discipline for
off-campus, intentional activity); Kathleen Conn, Offensive Student Web Sites:
[Vol. 87:630
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courts38 have concluded, resulted in an inability, or at least signifi-
cantly curtailed school officials' ability, to discipline students whose
off-campus speech creates a turbulent school environment. If that
speech is circulated at school and results in circumstances that "might
reasonably [lead] school authorities to forecast substantial disruption
of or material interference with school activities," discipline may still
be imposed that is consistent with the Constitution.3 9 A careful anal-
ysis of Tinker and its progeny reveals that the authority of school offi-
cials to discipline students for such conduct-regardless of whether it
is appropriately labeled as protected speech-remains well intact.
Tinker, when read in conjunction with Bethel School District No.
403 v. Fraser,40 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,41 and Morse
v. Frederick,42 illuminates the analytical framework for evaluating
the constitutional propriety of school discipline imposed upon a stu-
dent for certain types of off-campus cyberbullying. As part of the anal-
ysis as to what, if any, constitutional protection should be afforded a
student whose potentially disruptive off-campus cyberbullying perme-
ates the school building, one must be cognizant of the expectations
that the courts have placed upon our nation's educators to inculcate
youth with core values and character.43 With those expectations
comes the concurrent obligation to appropriately discipline students
What Should Schools Do?, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Feb. 2001, at 74, 76 (2001) (recog-
nizing that the "landscape upon which the line where the balance tips from pro-
tected speech for students to permissible punitive power for school
administrators has changed dramatically"); David L. Hudson, Censorship of Stu-
dent Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Right, Fear of the In-
ternet and Columbine, 200 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 199, 211 (2000) (suggesting
that schools overreach in imposing discipline and that there is a "history of seek-
ing to regulate student website speech that is merely offensive").
38. See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa.
2007) (finding violation of student's First Amendment rights because of insuffi-
cient nexus between student's off-campus conduct and any substantial disruption
of the school environment); Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791,800-01 (N.D.
Ohio 2002) (suggesting implausibility of school district's suggestion that there
was evidence that student's website substantially disrupted school activities and
inferring that without such evidence, First Amendment would likely prevent dis-
cipline from being imposed); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d
446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining that Tinker compelled conclusion that stu-
dent's suspension violated First Amendment because school district failed to ad-
duce any evidence of actual disruption); Klein v. Smith, 635 F. Supp. 1440, 1442
(D. Me. 1986) (overturning ten day suspension, explaining that "[t]he First
Amendment protection of freedom of expression may not be made a casualty of
the effort to force-feed good manners to the ruffians among us").
39. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
40. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
41. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
42. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
43. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 ('The inculcation of these values is truly the 'work of
the schools.'") (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508)
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whose speech interferes-actual or nascent-with the school's work or
which collides "with the rights of other students to be secure and to be
le[f]t alone."4a Further adding to the backdrop against which a stu-
dent's potential discipline should be analyzed is the fact that, while
not specifically recognized under the United States Constitution as a
fundamental right,45 a public education is considered by several state
courts to be a fundamental right under those states' respective consti-
tutions.4 6 Cyberbullying and its effects may certainly infringe upon,
and in some cases completely deprive some students of, those funda-
mental rights.4 7 In any event, any consideration of the constitutional-
44. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
45. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1973) (explaining
reasons why education is not a fundament right protected by the United States
Constitution).
46. See Alaska Commercial Fishing & Ag. Bank v. O/S Alaska Coast, 715 P.2d 707,
711 (Alaska 1986); Parker ex rel. Parker v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 46, 59
P.3d 806, 810 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002); Crenshaw v. Eudora Sch. Dist., 208 S.W.3d
206, 211 (Ark. 2005); O'Connell v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. Rptr. 3d 147, 163 (Dist.
Ct. App. 2006); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977); Sch. Bd. v.
Academies of Excellence, Inc., 974 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Bonner
ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 885 N.E.2d 673, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008); Rose v. Coun-
cil for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 206 (Ky. 1989); In re Expulsion of
N.Y.B., 750 N.W.2d 318, 327 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008); Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v.
Hughes, 765 So. 2d 528, 539 (Miss. 2000); Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville
Sch. Dist. 18, 548 S.W.2d 554, 558-59 (Mo. 1977); Kaptein By and Through
Kaptein v. Conrad Sch. Dist., 931 P.2d 1311, 1318 (Mont. 1997) (Nelson, J., con-
curring); Londondery Sch. Dist. SAU #12 v. State, No. 05-E-0406, 2006 WL
563120, at *2 (N.H. Super. Mar. 8, 2006); In re Grant of Charter Sch. Application
of Englewood on Palisades Charter Sch., 727 A.2d 15, 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999); Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake County Bd. of Educ., 660 S.E.2d 217,
229-230 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 402 N.W.2d 897,
899 (N.D. 1987); DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 779 (Ohio 1997) (Resnick, J.,
concurring); Pa. Human Relations Comm'n v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 681 A.2d 1366,
1380 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996); Meyers By and Through Meyers v. Bd. of Educ., 905
F. Supp. 1544, 1568-69 (D. Utah 1995); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt.
1997); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994); Tunstall ex rel.
Tunstall v. Bergeson, 5 P.3d 691 (Wash. 2000); Bd. of Educ. of County of
Kanawha v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 639 S.E.2d 893, 899 (W.Va. 2006); Vincent v.
Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 413 (Wis. 2000); Campbell County Sch. Dist. v. State,
181 P.3d 43, 49 (Wyo. 2008). A couple of states have conflicting views as to
whether education is a fundamental right. Compare Hancock v. Comm'r of
Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134 (Mass. 2005), with Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of
Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass. 1995) (holding no right to education when
student is expelled due to a safety threat). Compare Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v.
McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993), with C.S.C. v. Knox County Bd. of
Educ., No. 157833-2, 2006 WL 3731304 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2006) (stating
that Tennessee's courts have not held [to date] that education in Tennessee is a
fundamental right).
47. See, e.g., Whitely, supra note 9 (discussing teen suicides attributable, at least in
part, to cyberbullying); see also Abbott Koloff, States Push For Cyberbully Con-
trols, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/
[Vol. 87:630
TINKERING WITH SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
ity of school discipline in such cases must begin with a thorough
analysis of Tinker and its progeny.
III. TINKER, FRASER, HAZEL WOOD AND MORSE
ARTICULATE THE CONTOURS OF A CYBERBULLY'S
RIGHTS WITHIN THE SCHOOLHOUSE
The United States Supreme Court has clearly recognized that pub-
lic school students enjoy some First Amendment rights to freedom of
speech at school. Specifically, the Court first explained in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District4s that neither
students nor teachers "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."49 In the exercise of
those constitutional rights, however, it "does not follow ... that simply
because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohib-
ited to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the
same latitude must be permitted to children in a public school."50 In
Tinker and after, the Court developed and expanded upon its frame-
work for analyzing whether certain student speech enjoys First
Amendment protection, thereby shielding the speaker from disci-
pline.51 The Court has held that "[a] school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even
though the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school."
5 2
Where things get interesting, however, is when judges and educa-
tors attempt to analyze speech that originates outside of the school,
but ultimately finds its way into the halls of the schoolhouse. In an
effort to short-circuit the necessary analysis in such cases, some courts
will analyze whether such speech was accessed using school equip-
ment 53 or rigidly apply Tinker where off-campus speech makes its way
to the campus, even if by some other student. 54 Under Tinker and its
nationl2008-02-06-CyberbullyingN.htm (discussing suicide of Megan Meier
based, at least in part, upon what cyberbullies posted on the Internet).
48. 393 U.S. 503.
49. Id. at 506.
50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
51. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682.
52. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (internal citations omitted).
53. See, e.g., Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discuss-
ing how Tinker transformed what was originally off-campus speech into on-cam-
pus speech because students accessed the website at school); Killion v. Franklin
Reg'l. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001); Beussink ex rel. Beus-
sink v. Woodland R-LV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-78 (E.D. Mo. 1998)
(conducting an analysis under Tinker because several individuals had accessed
the website at school).
54. See, e.g., Boucher v. Sch. Bd. Dist. of Greenfield, 134 F.3d 821 (7th Cir. 1998);
Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch., 686 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Minn. 1987).
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progeny, courts should focus less on the origination of the speech and
more upon its effect and potential to cause discourse within the school-
house, regardless of who is responsible for injecting the speech into
the school environment. Put another way, a cyberbully's "undoubted
freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and
classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing in-
terest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate be-
havior,"55 particularly in an effort to avoid encouraging infringement
upon the rights of others within the school environment. Courts must
also consider school authorities' good faith beliefs as to what, if any,
facts are present that, at a minimum, might "reasonably [lead] school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interfer-
ence with school activities .. ".."56
A. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District57
The Court's initial foray into determining the parameters within
which public school authorities can regulate student speech without
impinging upon the First Amendment occurred in Tinker.5 8 Tinker
forced the Court to confront the constitutional difficulties raised by
the assertion of students' First Amendment rights in a high school set-
ting. The issue before the Tinker Court was whether the First Amend-
ment prevented the school from disciplining students responsible "for
a silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder
or disturbance . . . [and] not concern[ing] speech or action that in-
trudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students."
5 9
The Supreme Court held that the school authorities were not justified
in disciplining the "pure speech"60 present in Tinker, largely because
"the record does not demonstrate any facts which might reasonably
have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or ma-
terial interference with school activities ... ."61 The Court reiterated,
one last time near the end of its opinion, that the students did not
cause a disturbance or disorder on the school premises, and that they
simply "caused discussion outside of the classrooms, but no interfer-
ence with work and no disorder" occurred.
6 2
Although never specifically articulating as much, Tinker balanced
the student's First Amendment right to freedom of expression against
55. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
56. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 508.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 514.
62. Id.
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the school's right to maintain order and foster an educational environ-
ment, part of which involves precluding student speech from infring-
ing upon the rights of teachers or other students.6 3 Throughout its
opinion in Tinker, the Court-on not less than twelve different occa-
sions-made specific reference to the fact that there was no evidence
that the students' wearing of the armbands to protest the Vietnam
War would "substantially interfere with the work of the school or im-
pinge upon the rights of other students."64 Since there was no evi-
dence of any disruption or even a possibility of a disruption and since
the school district did not even contend that there could be such a dis-
ruption, 65 the Court easily concluded that Tinker's passive protest
was protected by the First Amendment. The Court explained that stu-
dents may express their opinions, "even on controversial subjects like
the conflict in Vietnam, if [they do] so without materially and substan-
tially interfering with the requirements of appropriate discipline in
the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of
others."66
The Court immediately qualified its holding, however, stating that
[Conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason-whether
it stems from time, place, or type of behavior-materially disrupts classwork
or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course,
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.
6 7
The Court closed its opinion by clarifying that the school authorities
could have justifiably imposed discipline upon the students had they
been able to demonstrate facts which might reasonably have led
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material in-
terference with school activities.68 Consequently, the "material dis-
ruption" and "reasonable forecast" standards were born.
Although Tinker held that the First Amendment prevented school
authorities from disciplining students for peacefully wearing their
black armbands, the Court repeatedly reiterated the rights of school
authorities to regulate speech that materially disrupts school affairs
or impinges upon the rights of others.69 Tinker also imposes limita-
tions upon that authority. First, school authorities must show that
their action was prompted by "something more than a mere desire to
avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint."70 Further, schools may not arbitrarily limit
63. See id. at 507-08.
64. Id. at 509; see, e.g., id. at 505, 508, 513, 514.
65. The school had prepared an official memorandum after the students were sus-
pended that did not even mention the possibility of a disruption. Id. at 509.
66. Id. at 513 (citations omitted).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 514.
69. Id. at 508.
70. Id. at 509.
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certain opinions, especially if those opinions are not mainstream or
may inspire fear.7 1 Finally, and perhaps the most critical for analysis
of cases involving cyberbullies, school authorities must have more
than an "undifferentiated," unqualified fear or apprehension of distur-
bance, as such is "not enough to overcome the right to freedom of
expression."
72
Thus, Tinker readily establishes that, so long as school authorities
do not act upon unqualified fear of disruption-presumably to avoid
educators stating such an unsubstantiated fear as a basis for sup-
pressing unpopular, unpleasant speech-but rather can articulate
some reasonable basis for finding that student speech will disrupt the
school environment or invade the rights of others, school authorities'
rights to develop and impose appropriate discipline will outweigh the
dissident's rights to harass and annoy other students who are simply
seeking to obtain an education. Put another way, if there is evidence
of a disruption or that one is likely to occur, the balance must be
tipped in favor of the school and the target.
B. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser73
Seventeen years after Tinker, the Court decided Bethel School Dis-
trict No. 403 v. Fraser.74 In Fraser, the Court availed itself of the op-
portunity to clarify the boundaries of a student's ability to avoid
discipline in school by invoking his First Amendment right to freedom
of expression. Matthew Fraser's speech was more unruly than was
Tinker's armband, and when he delivered his speech replete with sex-
ual innuendo during a required school assembly, after being warned
by at least two teachers not to do so, he received mixed reviews from
his fellow students. School authorities noted that some students
"hooted and yelled" during Fraser's speech, some made "gestures
graphically simulat[ing] sexual activities pointedly alluded to in [Fra-
ser's] speech," and other students were "bewildered and embarrassed
by the speech." 75 For delivering his racy speech, Fraser was sus-
pended for three days and his name was removed from the list of can-
didates who could be elected to speak at graduation. 76 After he served
two of the three days of his suspension, Fraser returned to school and
then he sued for a violation of his First Amendment rights.
71. Id. at 508.
72. Id.
73. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 678.
76. Id. It should be noted, however, that the trial court in Fraser held that the sus-
pension violated Fraser's First Amendment rights, and while the appeal was
pending, Fraser was elected graduation speaker by a write-in vote of his class-
mates, the result of which was that he delivered a speech at the commencement
ceremonies for his school. Id. at 679.
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Fraser began its analysis by stating that it was "a highly appropri-
ate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar
and offensive terms in public discourse,"7 7 and that school officials re-
tained the authority to discipline a student delivering a "vulgar and
lewd speech such as [Fraser's]" if the authorities determined that such
speech "undermine[d] the school's basic educational mission."78 The
Court went to great lengths to explain that a school was not the appro-
priate forum for a speech such as Fraser's and that there was an obvi-
ous concern on the part of "school authorities acting in loco parentis79
to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from exposure
to such explicit, indecent, or lewd speech."80 The Court explained that
Fraser's speech had "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
was of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from it was clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality."8 ' Citing Justice Black's dissent in Tinker, the
Court concluded that the U.S. Constitution does not compel school of-
ficials to "surrender control of the American public school system to
public school students."8
2
Because there was no disruption in Tinker, Fraser was the first
case in which the Court actually balanced the rights of the student
speaker against the rights of others-much to the chagrin of Matthew
Fraser.8 3 The Court was careful to remind school authorities that the
77. Id. at 683.
78. Id. at 685.
79. In Loco Parentis literally means "in place of a parent," Hickenbottom v. Hicken-
bottom, 239 Neb. 579, 593, 477 N.W.2d 8, 17 (1991), and "a person standing in
loco parentis to a child is one who has put himself or herself in the situation of a
lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident to the parental relationship,
without going through the formalities necessary to a legal adoption, and the
rights, duties, and liabilities of such person are the same as those of the lawful
parent." Weinand v. Weinand, 260 Neb. 146, 152-153, 616 N.W.2d 1, 6 (2000)
(quoting The Parenting Act, NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2901-2919 (Reissue 1993,
Cum. Supp. 1996 & Supp. 1997). The U.S. Supreme Court has acknowledged
that for many purposes a "school authorit[y] act[s] in loco parentis" in regard to
children attending school during the school day. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684. "As
early as 1837, state courts applied the in loco parentis principle to public schools."
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2631 (2007) (Thomas, J. concurring) (discuss-
ing in loco parentis in great detail as it has evolved in public school context and
the impact that it has upon the authority and attendant obligations of public
schoolteachers, but arguing that Tinker actually began erosion of doctrine within
the public school system, at least in First Amendment cases).
80. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 684.
81. Id. at 685 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978)).
82. Id. at 686 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting)).
83. The Fraser Court articulated the backdrop for its analysis by rearticulating the
balancing test that was necessary.
The marked distinction between the political "message" of the arm-
bands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent's speech in this
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fundamental values of "habits and manners of civility" taught in the
public schools must include "tolerance of divergent political and relig-
ious views, even when the views expressed may be unpopular."8 4
Thus, while the Court was careful to remind school authorities that
unpopular speech may be a necessary component in the process of
demonstrating the appropriate form of civil discourse,85 it is "the work
of the schools"86 to teach the "fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system,"8 7 which maintenance
likely "disfavor[s] the use of terms of debate highly offensive or highly
threatening to others."8 8
Fraser accepted and confirmed the wide latitude afforded school
officials in cases involving student speech. Observing that Fraser's
speech was "plainly offensive" to many in the school environment,
thereby infringing upon the rights of many others at the school,89 the
Court expressly recognized that school authorities must have latitude
to decide what expression and conduct is appropriate within the
school.90 "Balancing the right to free speech" within the schools "with
the goal of protecting the rights of others" where the speech has poten-
tial to disrupt the school or cause harm,91 the Court concluded that
Fraser's speech was not protected by the First Amendment. Put an-
other way, employing the balancing test repeatedly emphasized in
Tinker, Fraser struck the balance in favor of protecting the rights of
others and decorum within the school, and against affording First
Amendment protection to speech of such little social value as Fraser's
speech.92
case seems to have been given little weight by the Court of Appeals. In
upholding the students' right to engage in a nondisruptive, passive ex-
pression of a political viewpoint in Tinker, this Court was careful to note
that the case did "not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the
work of the schools or the rights of other students."
It is against this background that we turn to consider the level of
First Amendment protection accorded to Fraser's utterances and actions
before a high school assembly attended by 600 students.
Id. at 680-81.
84. Id. at 681 (quoting CHARLES A. BEARD ET AL., THE BEARDS' NEW BASIC HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)).
85. Id. at 683.
86. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
87. Id. at 681 (quoting Amback v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)).
88. Id. at 683.
89. Id. at 683-84.
90. Id. at 685-86.
91. Servance, supra note 6, at 1229.
92. See, e.g., id. (noting that Fraser protected the rights of others over the right to
speech of minimal social value).
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C. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier 9 3
Before the ink was even dry in Fraser, students in the Hazelwood
School District in St. Louis challenged a principal's decision to extri-
cate articles from a school newspaper. 94 The newspaper was written
and edited by a journalism class as part of the school curriculum.95
One of the censored articles described students' experiences with preg-
nancy, and the other was a discussion about the impact of divorce
upon students at the school. 96 The principal believed that the articles
might embarrass some students because the text might indicate which
students were the subjects of the articles, and there was not sufficient
time to make the necessary changes in the articles if the paper was to
be issued before the end of the school year. 97 Accordingly, the articles
were removed from the newspaper. Some students sued, asserting
that the removal of the articles violated their First Amendment
rights.9S
Hazelwood analyzed school authorities' ability to regulate student
speech in school from a slightly different perspective. Unlike Tinker
and Fraser, which both involved students' abilities to express their
ideas within the school setting, Hazelwood confronted the question9 9
of whether the First Amendment prevents schools from censoring ob-
jectionable speech in school-sponsored activities created by students
using school resources.10 0 Focusing upon the school's ability to "disas-
sociate itself,"101 "not only from speech that would 'substantially in-
terfere with [its] work . . . or impinge upon the rights of other
93. 484 U.S. 260 (1987).
94. Id. at 263-64.
95. Id. at 262.
96. Id. at 263.
97. Id. at 263-64.
98. Id. at 264.
99. The Hazelwood Court characterized the distinction as:
The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tol-
erate particular student speech-the question that we addressed in
Tinker-is different from the question whether the First Amendment re-
quires a school affirmatively to promote particular student speech. The
former question addresses educators' ability to silence a student's per-
sonal expression that happens to occur on the school premises. The lat-
ter question concerns educators' authority over school-sponsored
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that
students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive
to bear the imprimatur of the school.
Id. at 270-71. Thus, the critical inquiry in Hazelwood was really whether a
school could suppress speech originating with the student, but appearing to actu-
ally be speech of the school, or at least material that was uttered with the school's
approval.
100. Id. at 271-73.
101. Id. at 271 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
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students," 0 2 "but also from speech that is, for example, ungrammati-
cal, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vul-
gar or profane or unsuitable for immature audiences," 10 3 the Court
explained that "a school must be able to set high standards for the
student speech that is disseminated under its auspices-standards
that may be higher than those demanded by some newspaper publish-
ers or theatrical producers in the 'real' world-and may refuse to dis-
seminate student speech that does not meet those standards."O4
Where the expressive activity could reasonably be understood as being
conveyed with the school's imprimatur, the Court explained that
Tinker's required showing of a material disruption or at least a likeli-
hood of a disruption to the school purpose need not be satisfied-and
the First Amendment would still not be offended-when educators ex-
ercise editorial control "over the style and content of student speech in
school-sponsored expressive activities so long as [the school's] actions
are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."105
When read in conjunction with Tinker and Fraser, Hazelwood
stands for the proposition that school authorities can regulate student
speech that not only materially and substantially disrupts the school's
educational function, but also speech that is school-sponsored and
does not meet the school's standards in regard to academic integrity,
decency, or is unsuitable for immature audiences, especially when the
speech appears to bear the school's imprimatur.1 0 6 In the latter case,
the school need not establish the likelihood of a substantial disruption
at the schoolhouse, but only that the reasons for suppression of the
student-originated speech are reasonably related to legitimate aspects
of the school's basic educational mission,1 0 7 affording educators even
more latitude in censoring student speech appearing to bear the
school's imprimatur. Hazelwood explained that the First Amendment
is implicated in such cases only when "the decision to censor a school-
sponsored publication.., or other vehicle of student expression has no
valid educational purpose."os Hazelwood might explain why some
courts feel the need to develop a "nexus" between the use of school
resources and speech that originates off campus to justify imposition
of discipline in spite of the First Amendment,10 9 since the opinion
102. Id. at 271 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969)).
103. Id. at 271.
104. Id. at 271-72.
105. Id. at 273.
106. Id. at 271-73.
107. Id. at 273.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(noting that the school district had not established a "sufficient nexus" between
the student's website and "a substantial disruption of the school environment.");
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clearly articulates that there is a solid footing for discipline, or at least
some censorship, once school resources are used to circulate speech of
which the school disapproves.
D. Morse v. Frederick"o
The Court recently revisited the issue of school authority over stu-
dent speech in Morse v. Frederick."' In Morse, Joseph Frederick, a
high school senior, was allowed to leave class as part of "an approved
social event or class trip" to observe the Olympic Torch Relay as it
passed through Juneau, Alaska on its way to the 2002 Winter Olym-
pics in Salt Lake City, Utah.112 As the torch bearers passed Frederick
and his friends, the students "unfurled a fourteen-foot banner bearing
the phrase: 'BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."'113 Frederick's banner was easily
readable by the students attending the event and standing on the
other side of the street, as well as the school principal who was also
standing opposite Frederick and his friends. Principal Morse immedi-
ately crossed the street, demanded the students take down the ban-
ner, and when Frederick complained, Morse confiscated the banner
and ultimately suspended Frederick for displaying the banner which
Morse believed encouraged illegal drug use.1 14 After an administra-
tive appeal that resulted in his suspension being upheld, Frederick
filed suit alleging, inter alia, a violation of his First Amendment
rights.115
After clarifying that Morse was, in fact a school speech case, 116 the
Court reiterated what has become a foundational underpinning in
school speech cases-"the constitutional rights of students in public
school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in
110.
see also Erb, supra note 8, at 265-66 (discussing "nexus" requirement imple-
mented by some courts as rationale for their respective conclusions).
127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2622.
113.
114.
115.
116.
Id.
Id. at 2622-23.
Id. at 2623.
Possibly because of his concern that the Superintendent and the District Court
had correctly affirmed his suspension, Frederick attempted to argue that this
case was "not a school speech case." Id. at 2624. The Court easily disposed of this
argument, noting that the event at which Frederick displayed his banner oc-
curred during normal school hours, it was sanctioned by school authorities as an
.approved social event or class trip," and that the school had a presence at the
event through teachers and administrators being interspersed among the stu-
dents and being charged with supervising those students. Id. "Under these cir-
cumstances," the Court explained, "Frederick cannot stand in the midst of his
fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and claim he
is not at school." Id. (citation omitted)
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other settings."117 On the contrary, "student First Amendment rights
are 'applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environ-
ment."'lls "[W]hile children assuredly do not 'shed their constitu-
tional rights... at the schoolhouse gate,'. . . the nature of those rights
is what is appropriate for children in school."119 Focusing a great deal
on the substance of Frederick's banner and agreeing with Morse that
the banner undeniably promoted illegal drug use amongst his fellow
students, the Court concluded that the danger of illegal drug use
among students was "far more serious and palpable" than an "undif-
ferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance."120 The decision to
suspend Morse therefore "extend[ed] well beyond an abstract desire to
avoid controversy." 12 ' As such, the Court concluded that the First
Amendment does not require "schools to tolerate at school events stu-
dent expression that contributes to [the] dangers"122 of drug use, and
conveys the message that the school is not concerned about illegal
drug use among its students.
Since Tinker, the Court has repeatedly attempted to articulate the
boundaries of school authority to regulate student speech. Although
those boundaries may not be quite as definite as some courts and com-
mentators might desire,123 Tinker and its progeny do provide a struc-
tured analytical framework for determining whether the First
Amendment prohibits schools from disciplining students for injecting
certain types of speech into the school environment. Clearly, schools
have authority to regulate student speech, so long as school authori-
ties can show a reasonable belief that speech will substantially and
materially disrupt school activities or will substantially interfere with
the rights of others.124 A student's First Amendment rights are less
compelling when school authorities determine that the speech is inap-
propriate for the school setting, even though it may be speech that
would be protected if uttered by an adult outside of the school.125
117. Id. at 2626 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
118. Id. at 2627 n.2 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 506 (1969)).
119. Id. at 2627 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655-56
(1995)).
120. Id. at 2629 (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508).
121. Id. at 2629.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 2624 (noting that "[t]here is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries
as to when courts should apply school-speech precedents"); Layshock v. Hermit-
age Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 n.5 (W.D. Pa. 2007) (discussing how the
complexity of the area is illustrated by the 5-4 split of the U.S. Supreme Court
Justices in Morse).
124. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
125. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-686 (1986); see also
Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2626 (noting that Fraser's speech would have been protected
had it been uttered outside of a school setting).
[Vol. 87:630
TINKERING WITH SCHOOL DISCIPLINE
When school resources are devoted to the distribution of inappropriate
speech, the student's speech enjoys even less protection under the
First Amendment. 1
26
Cyberbullying is hardly speech that "is at the core of what the First
Amendment is designed to protect."127 Thus, cyberbullying is entitled
to little, if any, protection. As such, Tinker and its progeny command
that school authorities be afforded ample opportunity to protect the
educational environment via disciplining cyberbullies at school. The
need for such authority is emphasized when considered in light of how
the rights of others are affected when cyberbullying sneaks through
schoolhouse gates. By ignoring the impact cyberbullying has upon the
rights of others and focusing on the impractical circumstance of where
the speech originated, courts are handcuffing educators in the name of
the Constitution.
Courts should resist the temptation to focus on where the speech
originated since such an approach is not suited to the practical reali-
ties of today's technology.128 Instead, analysis should focus on where
the student speech has its impact (and often its intended impact) and
whether that impact is or potentially could be of such a magnitude to
justify discipline for injecting that speech into the school environ-
ment.12 9 The analysis of the impact that the speech does or reasona-
bly could have within the school is only one part of Tinker's balancing
test. To assess the propriety of school discipline, cyberbullies' limited
First Amendment rights must be balanced against the rights of others
affected when cyberbulling finds its way into the schoolhouse. Prop-
erly balancing those rights of others with the contribution to the "mar-
ketplace of ideas"13o provided by the cyberbully, if any, confirms the
impropriety of overturning school discipline of cyberbullies in the
name of the First Amendment.
126. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272-73 (1988).
127. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
128. See, e.g., Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 800 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (discuss-
ing significance of transformation from what was originally off-campus speech
into on-campus speech because students accessed the website at school); Killion
v. Franklin Reg'l. Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (noting
that "school officials' authority over off-campus expression is much more limited
than expression on school grounds"); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (noting that although the intended audi-
ence was "undoubtedly connected to" the high school attended by plaintiff, the
speech was outside of the school's supervision or control because it was not pro-
duced in connection with any class or school); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Wood-
land R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (conducting
Tinker analysis of what became on-campus speech because several individuals
had accessed the website at school).
129. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
130. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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IV. THE RIGHTS OF TARGETED STUDENTS AND THEIR
TEACHERS' OBLIGATIONS BOTH WEIGH HEAVILY
IN FAVOR OF ALLOWING DISCIPLINE TO BE
IMPOSED UPON THE CYBERBULLY
When cyberbullies are facing discipline at school, targets of
cyberbullies have rights that must factor into the calculus of whether
the imposition of disciple violates the First Amendment. Some states
find those rights to even be compelling.131 Even though the Supreme
Court of the United States has suggested that the right to an educa-
tion is not a fundamental right under the United States Constitu-
tion,13 2 some state courts have held that education is a fundamental
right under state law.133 Implicit in this fundamental right is that
the cyberbully's target has an ample opportunity for an education.134
Some courts have even held that the state itself has a compelling in-
terest in educating its students.135 Thus, any claim by a cyberbully
that his or her speech is constitutionally protected must be juxtaposed
with both the State's compelling interest in educating its students, as
well as the rights of the bully's target to receive an education.
Largely because the insignificant value of his speech is outweighed
by states' interests136 and the rights of others,137 the cyberbully fac-
ing discipline has no fundamental right to an education.13s This is
critical, from an analytical standpoint, because any discipline meted
out by school authorities will be constitutional so long as there is a
rational basis supporting the school's imposition of discipline.139 Put
131. See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
132. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 34-41 (1973).
133. See supra note 46.
134. RM & BC v. Washakie County Sch. Dist., 102 P.3d 868, 873 (Wyo. 2004) (empha-
sis supplied).
135. Id.; see also In re the Welfare of T.K., 475 N.W.2d 88, 92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(stating that "the state has a compelling interest in educating its citizenry");
State ex rel. Bartmess v. Bd. of Trs. of Sch. Dist. No. 1, 726 P.2d 801, 807 (Mont.
1986) (observing that Montana's constitution reflects a "compelling interest in
educating its citizens"); cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972) (acknowl-
edging that states have a high responsibility in the education of its citizenry).
136. See supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 156-64 and
accompanying text.
137. See infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text.
138. Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 251 Neb. 575, 581-82, 558 N.W.2d 807, 813
(1997); see also Doe v. Superintendent of Sch., 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1095 (Mass.
1995) (holding that a student who is expelled for misconduct does not have a
fundamental right to an education).
139. Kolesnick, 251 Neb. at 582, 558 N.W.2d at 813; see also Houston v. Prosser, 361 F.
Supp. 295, 298 (D. Ga. 1973) (applying the rational basis test to a school's policy
differentiating between students with children and students without children);
Leonard v. Sch. Comm. of Attleboro, 212 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Mass. 1965) (applying
the rational basis test to a school dress code); Shows v. Freeman, 230 So. 2d 63,
64 (Miss. 1969) (stating that the Court will let stand a school policy as long as
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another way, as long as the school's disciplinary actions are directed to
a legitimate purpose and are rationally related to achieving that pur-
pose, it is not unconstitutional.140 In light of the Supreme Court's
consistent affirmation of the "comprehensive authority of the [sitates
and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools,"14 1 courts
do not hesitate to conclude that suspension or expulsion is rationally
related to the school official's interest in protecting other students and
staff, as well as the environment in which the educational mission
must be fostered and implemented.14 2 Such a conclusion is quite easy
to reach in states where legislatures have provided 14 3 that teaching
personnel may take actions regarding student behavior which are rea-
sonably necessary to aid the student, further school purposes, or pre-
vent interference with the educational process.14 4
there is a rational basis for it); LoPresti v. Galloway Twp. Middle Sch., 885 A.2d
962, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2004) (stating that a school rule was "ration-
ally enacted for the purpose of maintaining order and protecting the safety of the
students"); Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 855 N.Y.S.2d 530, 536 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008) (upholding the lower court's finding that a school had a rational basis
for banning cell phones); Gfell v. Rickelman, 313 F. Supp. 364, 365 (D. Ohio 1970)
(finding a rational basis for a school's dress code); Texarkana Ind. Sch. Dist. v.
Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (stating that "[clourts should
uphold [school rules] where there is any rational basis for the questioned rule").
140. Kolesnick, 251 Neb. at 582, 558 N.W.2d at 813; see also Lewis, 470 S.W.2d at 734
("All that is necessary is a reasonable connection of the rule with the proper oper-
ation of the schools.").
141. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969).
142. Kolesnick, 251 Neb. at 582, 558 N.W.2d at 813; see also Lewis, 470 S.W.2d at 734
(applying the rational basis test to a school's decision to expel students for disrup-
tive behavior).
143. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-258 (Reissue 2003); see also ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
403, 15-2301 (West 2005) (recognizing ability of educators to use reasonable force
on students when reasonably necessary to maintain discipline); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 70, § 24-100.4 (West 2005) (affording teacher same right as a parent to control
a child according to district policy during time child is in attendance at school);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1161(a) (2004) (affording educators broad discretion in
disciplining children during school hours).
144. See In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 243 (Cal. 2001) (discussing statute permitting
any certificated employees to exercise the same degree of physical control over
students which parents would be legally privileged to exercise as long as it is
reasonably necessary to maintain conditions conducive to learning); Beeching v.
Levee, 764 N.E.2d 669, 679 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing Indiana statute au-
thorizing school principal to take any action within the principal's jurisdiction
reasonably necessary to carry out or prevent interference with an educational
function or school purpose); Shows, 230 So. 2d at 64 ("Provided there is some
rational basis for a rule by school authorities, the courts will not pass upon its
wisdom or desirability."); Daily v. Morrill County Sch. Dist., 256 Neb. 73, 84-85,
588 N.W.2d 813, 821 (1999) (providing discussion of NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-258);
Lewis, 470 S.W.2d at 734 ("The quicker judges get out of the business of running
schools the better. Except in extreme cases the judgment of school officials
should be final in applying a regulation to an individual case.")
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A. Cyberbullies Hide Behind the First Amendment Because
Their Conduct Prevents Invocation of Other Rights
Even in states where the cyberbully has a fundamental right to an
education, his conduct can result is his forfeiture of that right.145
Since a school and its officials will nearly always be able to articulate
a rational basis for the discipline imposed,146 a cyberbully's only
chance to successfully avoid discipline in these cases is to convince a
court that the United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of
discipline based upon a material disruption, or the reasonable
probability that a perceived disruption will materialize from a
cyberbully's off-campus speech. 14 7 Enter . . . the First Amendment.
In the context of such a challenge, Tinker not only allows discipline
when there is an actual disruption of school activities, but Tinker also
prescribes that a cyberbully's rights must be kept in check when
school authorities could reasonably have been led "to forecast substan-
tial disruption of or material interference with school activities ... [or]
instru[sion] in the school affairs or the lives of others."148 As such, the
First Amendment does not require school officials to forestall action
until disruption of the educational system actually occurs. 149 Much to
the contrary, educators are expected to protect and to foster the educa-
tional environment, as "[e]vents calling for discipline are frequent oc-
currences and sometimes require immediate, effective action."
15 0
When educators are called upon to discipline the cyberbully, the
First Amendment does not provide the cyberbully impenetrable shel-
145. RM & BC v. Washakie County Sch. Dist., 102 P.3d 868, 874 (Wyo. 2004).
146. See, e.g., Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Worcester, 653 N.E.2d 1088 (Mass.
1995); Kolesnick, 251 Neb. 575, 558 N.W.2d 807; LoPresti v. Galloway Twp. Mid-
dle Sch., 885 A.2d 962, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005); see also Parker ex rel.
Parker v. Ariz. Interscholastic Ass'n, Inc., 59 P.3d 806, 812 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)
(applying the rational basis test in analyzing a rule requiring students to refrain
from participation in interscholastic activities immediately after transfer); Leo-
nard v. Sch. Comm. of Attleboro, 212 N.E.2d 468, 472 (Mass. 1965) (upholding
decision to prevent student with extreme haircut from attending high school be-
cause decision and rule pursuant to which it was made were based upon "some
rational basis"); Price v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 855 N.Y.S.2d 530, 538 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008) (subjecting school rule prohibiting cell phones possessed by stu-
dents to rational basis analysis).
147. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); see
also Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 178 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding
that school administration did not produce evidence that videos available
through students' web page would likely result in a substantial interference with
the operation of the school).
148. Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (quoting Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)).
149. Id. at 29-30.
150. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985) (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 580 (1975)); see also Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007) (noting
that Principal Morse had "to decide to act-or not to act-on the spot").
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ter. Of course, cyberbullying may not rise to the level of obscenity,151
fighting words,15 2 or hate speech,15 3 each of which the Supreme Court
has specifically explained enjoys no protection under the First Amend-
ment. If it does rise to such a level, courts need not address the issue
that arises when speech created off campus finds its way onto campus.
Quite possibly, a cyberbully's speech-if posted on the Internet by an
adult who is not a part of the school environment-may very well be
speech that enjoys First Amendment protection. 154 The Supreme
Court has provided, however, that a student's rights are not coexten-
sive with those of adults. 15 5 In fact, the "preservation of order and a
proper educational environment requires close supervision of school
children, as well as the enforcement of rules against conduct that
would be perfectly permissible if undertaken by an adult."156 As co-
gently expressed by one jurist, "the First Amendment gives a high
school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's armband, but not
Cohen's jacket."15 7 Since cyberbullying causes a disruption, or at
least there is a reasonable probability that other students' reactions
thereto will cause a disruption for teachers or other students, Tinker
allows educators wide latitude to impose discipline before the disrup-
tion escalates to something other than civil disobedience.158 In other
words, Tinker foresaw the possibility that educators may need to be
proactive in imposing discipline, recognizing, at least implicitly, that
there may be cases where it would be improvident to await actual
harm before disciplining a student.159
151. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
152. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
153. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
154. See, e.g., Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 892 (1997); Am. Book-
sellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2003).
155. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339; see also supra notes 50-52, 116-26 and accompanying
text.
156. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339.
157. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979); see also infra note
192 (summarizing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
158. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969).
Tinker presupposes that analysis is properly conducted from the perspective of
the educator, neither from the perspective of the student or from the post hoc
perspective of a court considering whether to justify and/or overturn the educa-
tor's decision.
159. This is never more apparent than when extreme cases of cyberbullying are ana-
lyzed in hindsight. Certainly, in light of what happened in cases such as Ryan
Halligan's and Megan Meier's, it would be difficult to see how one might contend
that teachers should have to wait for at least one catastrophic "disruption" before
censoring student speech. Tinker does not require that educators do so. See
Courtney Blanchard, Hacked MySpace Page Used To Deliver School Threat, STAR
TRIB., November 18, 2007, available at http://www.startribune.com/local/
11830866.html.
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B. If Fostering and Maintaining an Educational
Environment Is Truly "the Work of the Schools,"160
Educators Must Be Allowed to Do Their Jobs
Teachers have, and traditionally have had, great latitude in pre-
serving an orderly, educational environment for schoolchildren.161
Educators are expected to foster an educational environment through
serving as role models and teaching "by example the shared values of
a civilized social order."16 2 An educator's responsibility is arguably
more than simply teaching by example. The High Court has expressly
recognized the state's interest in having school authorities, "acting in
loco parentis," to protect children-as part of a captive audience-
from exposure to indecent and other types of speech. 16 3 These obliga-
tions extend far beyond decisions over whether educators should be
allowed to circumscribe the cyberbully's ability to disrupt the school
environment from his or her den at home. Those obligations include
protecting the rights of the other students, preserving the educational
environment at the schoolhouse, and in some instances, protecting the
school and even the educators themselves from facing individual lia-
bility as a result of not addressing the harassment meted out by the
cyberbully in a timely fashion.164
Potential liability aside, it has been recognized that school officials
"have a duty to prevent the occurrence of disturbances," and that
"[f]orecasting disruption[s] is unmistakably difficult to do."165 Educa-
160. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (citing Tinker,
393 U.S. at 508).
161. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
("Applying in loco parentis, the judiciary was reluctant to interfere in the routine
business of school administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and en-
force rules and to maintain order .... [In this regard], [c]ourts routinely pre-
served the rights of teachers to punish speech that the school or teacher thought
was contrary to the interests of the school and its educational goals."). In Fraser,
the Court acknowledges that an obvious concern "on the part of parents, and
school authorities acting in loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a cap-
tive audience-from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech." Fra-
ser, 478 U.S. at 684. Other courts have restated this view. See Caudillo ex rel.
Caudillo v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 311 F. Supp. 2d 550, 570 (N.D. Tex. 2004);
Jamshidnejad v. Cent. Curry Sch. Dist., 108 P.3d 671, 677 (Or. Ct. App. 2005).
162. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683.
163. Id. at 684.
164. See, e.g., Susan H. Kosse, Student Designed Home Web Pages: Does Title IX or the
First Amendment Apply?, 43 ARiz. L. REV. 905, 919-20 (2001) (explaining the
legitimacy of the concern of schools and students alike as to whether cyberbully-
ing via the Internet can create a hostile work environment actionable under Title
IX).
165. LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied 536
U.S. 959 (2002).
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tors need not await an actual disruption.1 66 Consequently, the proper
inquiry when evaluating the propriety of school discipline in the wake
of turbulent student speech is whether there are "facts which might
reasonably lead school officials to forecast a substantial
disruption."
167
Tinker allows educators to be proactive. If educators are proactive,
courts must not presume that educators will overreact to innocent stu-
dent speech or speech that is not likely to infringe upon the rights of
others at the schoolhouse. Such a presumption, without more, is the
type of "undifferentiated fear"168 that the Supreme Court has held
should not govern the outcome of cases involving student speech.
Courts must afford educators the ability to fashion appropriate disci-
pline if the circumstances present themselves, especially since educa-
tors may be held individually liable for violations of a students'
constitutional rights at the schoolhouse. 169 The potential for such lia-
bility helps alleviate the concern of those who fear that educators will,
in every case, seek to impose discipline or "to justify a prohibition of a
particular expression of opinion... [based upon nothing] more than a
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint."170 At a minimum, educators
should be trusted to refrain from imposing discipline upon the
cyberbully unless circumstances within the school require it. If, in
fact, they do not, the potential for liability poses a significant
deterrent.
166. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-14 (1969); see
also LaVine, 257 F.3d at 989 ("Tinker does not require school officials to wait
until disruption actually occurs before they may act. In fact, they have a duty to
prevent the occurrence of disturbances.") (citations omitted); Dodd v. Rambis, 535
F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (noting that "consideration must also be given to
all other circumstances confronting school authorities which might reasonably
prompt a forecast of disruption").
167. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
168. Id. at 508.
169. See Pinard v. Clatskanie Sch. Dist. 6J, 446 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding
that there was genuine issue of material fact in regard to school officials' liability
for retaliatory motive in suspending basketball players, potentially in violation of
First Amendment); Byars v. Waterbury, 795 A.2d 630 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2001)
(involving action by student seeking to hold school officials liable for violation of,
inter alia, First Amendment rights); Morlock v. West Cent. Educ. Dist., 46 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 914 (D. Minn. 1999) (recognizing that individuals are subject to
liability under Section 1983 for violations of Title IX and other constitutional
rights); Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. West High Sch., 900 F. Supp. 254, 266-67
(D. Utah 1995) (discussing student's attempt to hold school officials responsible
for violation of First Amendment rights); see also Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist.,
15 F.3d 443, 454 (5th Cir. 1994) (articulating standard pursuant to which school
officials can be liable for subordinate's violation of student's constitutional rights,
albeit not First Amendment rights).
170. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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Mindful of the potential for individual liability in the most egre-
gious cases, educators will certainly be wary of adhering to policies
favoring or requiring discipline in the most questionable cases, where
there is little to no likelihood of a disruption. It is not suggested, nor
would the law support the conclusion, that educators be afforded un-
bridled discretion, as such a position would undoubtedly transform
schools into "enclaves of totalitarianism" and convert students into
"closed-circuit recipients of only that which the [schools] choose ... to
communicate.'71 Schools must not become "an Orwellian guardian-
ship of the public mind"17 2 that can "strangle the free mind at its
source,"173 but, at a minimum, schools must be allowed to prevent the
cyberbully-often someone who is afraid to even confront the subject
of his or her attack-from causing a disruption from miles away when
that same person does not believe in his or her speech enough to even
have it originate on the school grounds.174
Some have expressed fear that affording teachers wide latitude in
censoring cyberbullies would have a chilling effect on speech because
it gives rise to self-censorships and the diminishment of the market-
place of ideas.175 Logically, however, if cyberbullies are seeking to
contribute anything to the "marketplace of ideas," then their conduct
will likely not subject them to discipline within the school system,
since such speech is more than likely not the type of speech that will
cause a substantial or material disruption, or would reasonably lead
educators to the conclusion that such a disruption is imminent. It is
hard to comprehend how allowing educators to discipline speech solic-
iting financial support for a "hit" on a teacher,176 compiling a vulgar
top ten list about an educator or fellow student,177 or misusing private
information disclosed by a student under false pretenses to humiliate
171. Id. at 511.
172. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 286 (1988) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); see also Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d
1135, 1141 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that the "School District must not become an
Orwellian 'guardianship of the public mind'") (citing Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
173. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 637 (1943); see also Colin, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1141 (explaining that
schools do not have the power to "'strangle the free mind at its source'") (quoting
Barnette v. West Virginia Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
174. See, e.g., Noguchie, supra note 15, at lB.
175. Caplan, supra note 37, at 148-49; see also Erb, supra note 8, at 283 (noting that a
criticism of allowing school districts to discipline off-campus speech is that it may
have a chilling effect on speech).
176. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2002).
177. See Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 448-49 (W.D. Pa.
2001).
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that student to the point that he takes his own life178 will in any way
diminish the "free trade of ideas."1 79 It is difficult to conceive of the
contribution being made to the "marketplace" by cyberbullies. Rarely
do these people even suggest that they are contributing to the "mar-
ketplace,"lso and teachers are in at least as good of a position as
judges to evaluate a cyberbully's contribution. As such, teachers
should be afforded the latitude provided in Tinker.
C. Encouraging Cyberbullies to Respect the Rights of
Others Is Not a Bad Thing
Targets of cyberbullying should be allowed to attend school with-
out fear of being subjected to hurtful, sometimes malicious, cyberbul-
lying. As one commentator has correctly asserted:
The right for one student to feel safe and comfortable in the school setting
should outweigh another student's right to make offensive remarks. Hateful
or purposefully derogatory speech should be treated differently than political
or academic speech, especially when directed to those of tender years. If al-
lowing schools to discipline children for cyberbullying incidents will encourage
students to "monitor their thoughts and statements" and have a "chilling ef-
fect" on the type of harassment and bullying taking place on the web sites of
school children, it may not be such a bad thing.'
8 1
In this context, "chilling" the cyberbully hardly seems like anything
more than an inconvenience imposed upon someone who "add[s] little
information and even fewer ideas to the marketplace."' 8 2 As such,
cyberbullying is hardly the type of expression "at the core of what the
First Amendment is designed to protect."
8 3
1. Cyberbullies Add Very Little to the "Marketplace of Ideas"
The reason for the First Amendment's ban on official censorship is
because in a free society, we rely upon this so-called "marketplace of
ideas."18 4 The potential, yet not likely, impact on the "marketplace" if
schools are afforded latitude in disciplining cyberbullies however,
overshadows and even ignores the duties placed upon our educators to
178. See Whitely, supra note 9 (explaining how private information disclosed to class-
mates via e-mail under pretense that he was sharing information with coveted
classmate was used to spread rumors that teenage boy was gay, and suggesting
that such conduct played a role in teenager's suicide).
179. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
180. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007); Requa v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415,
492 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1272 (W.D. Wash. 2007); Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ.,
205 F. Supp. 2d 791 (N.D. Ohio 2002).
181. Erb, supra note 8, at 283-84 (emphasis added).
182. U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 935 (3d Cir.
1990).
183. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
184. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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preserve and foster an educational environment, and through the doc-
trine of in loco parentis,18 5 to inculcate in our young people "habits
and manners of civility."186 Such manners and civility, of course, in-
clude a "tolerance of divergent political and religious views, even when
the views expressed may be unpopular."18 7 Though the state educa-
tion system, through its educators, has the awesome responsibility of
inculcating moral and political values,188 educators should not act as
"thought police" seeking to inhibit all discussion that is not approved
by, and in accord with, the official position of the school.1 89 Just the
same, cyberbullies must be cognizant that the First Amendment is dif-
ferent in public schools than elsewhere,1 9o and that, "in light of the
special characteristics of the school environment,"19 1 educators must
be afforded latitude to decide what student speech is appropriate, sub-
ject to constitutional limitations.
Another factor to be balanced against the distribution of electronic
harassment at school is that, unlike other targets of unpopular speech
or expressive activities, targets of cyberbullying are seriously limited
in their ability to avoid cyberbullying and its effects. Certainly,
targets of cyberbullies are "captives" who are "subject to objectionable
speech" 19 2 when their classmates are talking about derogatory infor-
mation posted on the Internet by other students. Allowing cyberbul-
lies to use the schoolhouse as their soapbox is particularly troubling
when the cyberbully is able to paint his or her disparaging remarks
with such a "broad stroke." In one case, for example, a student posted
a website on which he included a list of "the losers [he] would love to
185. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2632 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring).
186. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
187. Id.
188. See id.
189. Colin ex rel. Colin v. Orange Unified Sch. Dist., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1141 (C.D.
Cal. 2000).
190. See, e.g., Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2627 (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 655-56 (1995)).
191. See, e.g., id. at 2627 n.2 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (citations omitted).
192. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). Cohen, of course, involved Califor-
nia's attempt to convict an individual for disturbing the peace because he wore a
jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" in a place where women and children
were present. Relying, at least in part, upon Tinker, the Court emphasized that
Mr. Cohen's jacket caused no disruption in the courthouse and that there was no
evidence that others even objected to Cohen's jacket. Id. at 21-23. The Court
then explained that upholding the conviction would be "untenable," reasoning
that doing so would be tantamount to allowing the States to impose censorship in
the name of avoiding physical censorship "of one who has not sought to provoke
such a response by a hypothetical coterie of the violent and lawless." Id. at 23. In
the Court's view, allowing such censorship was not far removed from allowing
school discipline based only upon an "undifferentiated fear or apprehension of
disturbance." Id. The First Amendment, of course, sanctions neither, and it is
not suggested herein that it should.
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shoot and freshmen girls [he] would love to kill."193 Aside from stu-
dents' rights to transfer to another school or to attend private school,
and a teacher's right to find work elsewhere, it is difficult to imagine a
more captive audience 194 than public school students and teachers.
Students often have few, if any, choices that might allow them to
avoid cyberbullying, particularly in light of compulsory attendance
laws requiring that students attend school through a certain age and/
or grade level.
19 5
When viewed in light of the potential effects upon the targets of
cyberbullies 19 6 it becomes more apparent that school cyberbullies
should not be allowed to hide behind the First Amendment in the face
of discipline from school authorities. Allowing them to continue to do
so certainly exacerbates issues currently facing students and school
officials subject to such attacks, all the while allowing cyberbullies to
continue to trample rights of those fellow students or teachers from
miles away. Although the cyberbully certainly has a protected inter-
est in "expos[ing] unwilling viewers" to some speech, the First Amend-
ment does not afford him or her "an unqualified constitutional right to
follow and harass an unwilling listener."197 Targets should not be
forced to try and avoid the bully, his cohorts, and their discussion of
the bully's off-campus speech, especially when the targeted student is
required to be in attendance at the school where the relationship is
centered. Similarly, the targeted student should not be expected to
transfer and a targeted teacher should not be required to look for
other employment because a cyberbully is savvy enough to post death
threats on the Internet.19 s
2. The Rights of Other Students and Teachers Outweigh the
Cyberbully's Contribution, if Any, to the "Marketplace
of Ideas"
In light of the foregoing, the cyberbully's First Amendment rights,
if any, to disparage his or her teachers and classmates on the Internet
193. Georgia East, Web Threats May Yield More Arrests, ASBURY PARK PRESS, Nov. 10,
1999, at Al, A5.
194. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) (acknowl-
edging "the obvious concern on the part of parents, and school authorities acting
in loco parentis, to protect children-especially in a captive audience-from expo-
sure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech").
195. See U.S. Dept. of Educ., Nat'l. Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Digest of Education Sta-
tistics (2006), available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d07/tables/dt07-
157.asp. (containing exhaustive listing of compulsory attendance laws and con-
cise summaries of each).
196. See, e.g., Servance, supra note 6, at 1216 nn.14-23; infra notes 240-45.
197. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 781 (1994) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
198. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
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should not protect him or her from school discipline. The bully's
speech is entitled to little protection when weighed against the rights
of others.199 So long as there are reasonable facts that could lead
"school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material in-
terference with, school activities,"20 0 discipline is warranted. Any
analysis of cyberbullies' rights must begin from the touchstone of
knowing that cyberbullies' speech is not entitled to absolute protection
when the speech finds its way onto school property. When that speech
does find its way onto school property, it often is the "type of behavior
[that] materially disrupts classwork or involves [a] substantial disor-
der or invasion of the rights of others [and] is, of course, not immu-
nized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech."20 1
When the protections afforded that speech are analyzed in light of
the rights of others affected-including the rights of the other stu-
dents, the teachers, and the school system itself to educate its stu-
dents, as Tinker commands-the conclusion is readily apparent that
those courts who have not cowered in the face of cyberbullies' First
Amendment defenses have made the correct legal decision.202 Any
analysis of these types of cases must keep in mind that
[tihe purpose of the free-speech clause ... is to protect the market in ideas,
broadly understood as the public expression of ideas, narratives, concepts, im-
agery, opinions-scientific, political, or aesthetic-to an audience whom the
speaker seeks to inform, edify, or entertain. Casual chit-chat between two per-
sons or otherwise confined to a small social group is unrelated, or largely so, to
that marketplace, and is not protected. Such conversation is important to its
participants but not to the advancement of knowledge, the transformation of
taste, political change, cultural expression, and the other objectives, values
and consequences of the speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
2 0 3
As such, cyberbullying must be analyzed for what it is-distasteful
commentary intended to harm another student or a teacher, which
often interferes with the rights of others to participate in their educa-
tion, with the school's ability to educate properly and effectively, and
perhaps with an educator's ability to do his or her job.204 As the Su-
199. See Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1994) (affirming lower
court's issuance of restraining order preventing child from taunting and harass-
ing another juvenile and supporting conclusion by noting that, on the facts of this
case, "incessant teasing" and harassment constituted fighting words not pro-
tected by First Amendment).
200. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
201. Id. at 513 (citation omitted).
202. See J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 419 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2000), affd, 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002) (holding that First Amendment was not
violated, even after noting that "the matter presently before [the Court] in-
volve[d] speech that occurred off of school premises and was communicated to
others via the Internet"); Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
203. Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1188 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting
Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1990)).
204. Servance, supra note 6, at 1238.
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preme Court recently stated, "[s]chool principals have a difficult job
and a vitally important one."20 5 Consequently, "[c]ourts [must] recog-
nize that schools are in a better position to decide whether off-campus
conduct poses a disruption to school[s],"206 and refrain from interfer-
ing with those decisions by subjecting them to rigid rules, the applica-
tion of which incorrectly focuses largely on where the speech
originated instead of where it has the greatest impact.
20 7
V. PROPERLY FOCUSING ON WHETHER A DISRUPTION
OF THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT TAKES PLACE, IN
SPITE OF THE ORIGINATION POINT OF THE STUDENT
SPEECH, ALLOWS A PROPER ANALYSIS OF
STUDENT WEBSITES UNDER TINKER
Territoriality is not necessarily a useful concept in determining the
limit of an educator's authority to discipline student speech.20 8 Con-
trary to some suggestions, Tinker and its progeny do not suggest that
the Court has assumed that school authority over student speech
"ends as the student leaves the schoolhouse." 20 9 Much to the con-
trary, although Tinker and its progeny likely did not foresee the ad-
vent of student blogging and its potential impact upon teachers and
students inside the schoolhouse, those cases do provide an analytical
framework under which courts can uphold students being disciplined
for off-campus speech, so long as that speech disrupts or has the ten-
dency to disrupt the school environment. 2 10 With the Internet readily
available and accessible, students often resort to websites or similar
mediums to express frustration with teachers or those in power, or to
mimic popular culture or other students. 2 11 Often, their doing so is
not with good intentions.
Usually cyberbullying is created with the intent that it has an ef-
fect at school. When courts curtail authorities' jurisdiction over stu-
205. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2629 (2007).
206. Servance, supra note 6, at 1234; see also Pollnow v. Glennon, 594 F. Supp. 220,
221 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (wherein the court acknowledged that school authorities
are in the best position to determine whether their school's educative process may
be adversely effected or the health, safety or morals of its pupils may be so
effected).
207. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008); Wisniewski, 494 F.3d
at 39; Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 591 (W.D. Pa.
2007); J.S. ex rel. H.S., 807 A.2d at 856.
208. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
209. Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School
Students, 2000 BYU EDuc. & L.J. 123, 142 (2000).
210. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
211. See Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space: The First Amendment Parameters of
School Discipline of Student Cyberspace, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER AND HIGH
TECH. L.J. 727, 729-30 (2007).
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dent speech just because it originates outside of the schoolhouse, they
ignore the reality that the speech likely would never have occurred in
the first instance but for the relationship between the speaker and the
target of the speech-a relationship deriving from both of their pres-
ence within the schoolhouse. The more appropriate analysis, then, is
to focus upon the impact of the speech in light of the intent of the
speaker, the analysis under which the Supreme Court initially ana-
lyzed Tinker's wearing of his black armband.
A. Analysis of Students' First Amendment Rights to
Cyberbully Must Account for the Borderless Nature
of the Internet
The High Court has recognized that, unlike the school grounds, the
Internet has no borders. 21 2 Consequently, targets of cyberbullies are
required to confront their aggressors outside of the schoolhouse, as
well as in the school corridors. Cyberbullying spreads quickly because
of the swift distribution fostered by the Internet, and students also
face their aggressors on buses, at school activities, and possibly even
at community functions having nothing to do with the school. Given
its quick and easy distribution to recipients both known and unknown,
cyberbullies are given an advantage that distributors of traditional
forms of expression such as flyers, posters, newspapers, and other
forms of printed materials did not enjoy.2 1 3 Even more problematic is
that the cyberbully can utter his or her hurtful words from within the
comfort of his or her own home and disseminate them to a larger num-
ber of people than if he or she was actually standing in the school foyer
or auditorium. Given this inherently different mode of expression,
courts analyzing disruptions inside the schoolhouse based upon where
the disruptive speech originated are doing educators and the First
Amendment a major disservice. 2 14 Although the origination point of
the speech may be relevant, it must not be determinative. Homage
must be paid to the effect of the bullying, as well as to the rights of
those at whom it is aimed.
21 5
Clearly, the First Amendment does not immunize students who
use words to invade the rights of others. 2 16 Given the lack of physical
borders of the Internet and the potential harm caused by cyberbul-
212. See generally Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 889-90 (1997).
213. See Servance, supra note 6, at 1235.
214. See id. at 1235-36.
215. See, e.g., Hara E. Marano, Big. Bad. Bully., PSYCHOL. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1995, at
52, available at http://www.psychologytoday.comlarticles/lPTO-19950901-000020.
html (discussing America's slow realization of the harmful effects and conse-
quences of bullying behavior).
216. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
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lies,217 the critical determination, as Tinker prescribes, must be
whether there is a reasonable probability that the cyberharrassment
will cause a material disruption within the school environment and
whether that speech invades the rights of the other students and/or
teachers. Certainly, educators are not required to await an incident
like the Columbine shootings if they believe a student might execute
other students, or cause significant stress to others on his '"it list."218
If the focus remains upon the school environment and the potential
disruption therein, educators can at least account for the personalities
and similarities involved, past history of the speaker and the target,
and the fact that much of the speech would never have been uttered in
the first place absent a relationship that was conceived at school. Re-
moving that relationship from the school corridors, and placing it on
the Internet in the form of cyberbullying, should not immunize the
speaker from discipline when the latter subsequently disrupts the
school environment-the very environment encouraging the bullying
in the first instance.
Courts are ill-equipped to delineate boundaries in regard to stu-
dent Internet speech, and their attempts to do so turn the First
Amendment inside out. One cannot reasonably dispute that the con-
tent of student-created Internet websites is discussed at school.219 In
the context of cyberbullies, those websites often involve seriously dis-
turbing parodies or false information regarding members of the school
community, much of which has a very probable likelihood to disrupt
the school environment.2 20 Increasing the probability of disruption is
the fact, or at least the possibility, that many of the students reading
the website may know the target of the conversation, and more stu-
dents call the website to the attention of others who may know the
target, all of whom then discuss the website at school. In the case of
teachers and fellow students alike, the on-campus discussion of the
student website cultivates an attitude of disrespect and contempt to-
ward the cyberbully's target at school. Certainly, if the website is not
the subject of disrupting discussions at school, then the circumstances
are significantly different.2 2 1
217. See supra notes 192-98 and accompanying text.
218. See East, supra note 193; see also supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
219. Servance, supra note 6, at 1223; see supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.,
607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979); Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. 05-1076,
2005 WL 2106562 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005); Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich,
236 F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Mich. 2002); Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000); J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist.,
807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002).
221. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
(noting that student's website was not involved in "the buzz" at school).
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The current state of the law as to how the Tinker analysis applies
to cyberbullying is, at best, unsettled. Several courts have found that
Internet speech created off-campus cannot be the subject of school dis-
ciplinary action.2 22 Had Courts properly focused on the disruptive
tendencies of the student websites in some of the cases that have been
decided,2 23 not only would those students have been disciplined for
conduct warranting as much, but perhaps the current state of the law
in this regard would be less muddled. For example, one court even
rationalized its decision that a student had a substantial likelihood of
success on his First Amendment claim by explaining that "[a]lthough
the intended audience was undoubtedly connected to [the school], the
speech was entirely outside of the school's supervision or control."224
Such a rigid analysis ignores what Tinker was intended to protect
against-a disruption of the educational environment. Moreover, edu-
cators and students are provided no clear guidance as to what speech
is protected by the First Amendment and what is not.
B. In an Effort to Accommodate the Borderless Nature of
the Internet, Courts Get Caught Up in Distinctions
and Demarcations Not Pertinent to the Tinker
Analysis
Between decisions focusing on where student speech originated
and others adhering to Tinker, perhaps because courts are uncomfort-
able with cyberbullying, courts have reached differing conclusions on
cases with similar facts. In one case, a Pennsylvania court correctly
upheld discipline imposed upon a student, taking note of the disrup-
tion that the student's website had upon a teacher and upon the school
environment in general.225 In a similar case, a federal court in Mis-
souri overturned a suspension reasoning that the discipline stemmed
not from a fear of disruption so much as it did from the administrators
of the school being offended. 22 6 In another case, it was concluded that
there was no disruption caused by a student-created "Satan's Page,"
222. See, e.g., Coy ex rel. Coy v. Bd. of Educ., 205 F. Supp. 2d 791, 799-800 (N.D. Ohio
2002) (discussing how Tinker transformed what was originally off-campus speech
into on-campus speech because students accessed the website at school); Killion
v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (explaining
that "school officials' authority over off-campus expression is much more limited
than expression on school grounds"); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV
Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1177-80 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (analysis conducted
under Tinker because several individuals had accessed the website at school).
223. See Servance, supra note 6, at 1237 ("Courts should instead apply the principle
that is intuitive to most Internet users: Internet speech resides in cyberspace,
which is borderless and exists wherever there is a connection to the Internet.).
224. Emmett, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.
225. J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 757 A.2d 412, 422 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2000).
226. Beussink ex rel. Beussink, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1178.
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which listed students that the creator thought were "cool" or that he
"wish[ed] would die,"2 27 even though the Court presented very little
analysis underpinning its ultimate conclusion. Had the courts focused
on the impact of the student speech or even analyzed the nature of the
speech and its likely (and certainly intended) effect upon its targets at
school, the outcome of all three cases likely would have been the same.
The suspensions of all of the students would have been upheld.
Certainly, the law is not incapable of distinguishing between activ-
ity that concerns the school community and activity that does not, and
each of the aforementioned cases certainly targeted members of the
school community.22 s Educators must be allowed to discern whether
such off-campus speech is likely to cause a disruption within the four
walls of the schoolhouse, particularly since educators are more likely
to be aware of the students and the teachers at the center of such
disputes. Educators are likely aware of past disputes between the
cyberbully and the target and they may actually be in a position to
make a decision to prevent an actual disruption-foregoing the need
to impose discipline at all. If there is a reasonable basis for concluding
that a disruption will occur and discipline is subsequently imposed,
however, the cyberbully should not be allowed to avoid the conse-
quences of his or her actions 229 by seeking refuge in the First
Amendment.
Analysis of cyberbullying cases must focus on the impact that such
speech has on its targets, and it must also consider the school environ-
ment in which those targets are asked to function.2 30 Properly focus-
ing the analysis of student speech on the disruption or likelihood of a
material disruption, at least some of which is cyberbullying of teach-
ers or classmates, will clarify the propriety of the discipline and will
227. Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
As one commentator has pointed out, Mahaffey's website created a disruption.
See Servance, supra note 6, at 1243. The website was violent, and because of its
nature, it was foreseeable that the students portrayed and discussed on the web-
site would be adversely affected. Id. Those students identified as those Mahaffey
wanted to "die" could have interpreted the site as a threat, and they may have
decided against attending school, which would, in turn, interfere with the school's
ability to educate those students and with those student's rights to obtain an
education. Id. Since no analysis of the impact of this website was conducted by
the court, there was no way of knowing whether the Court even considered the
possibility that disruption of the educational environment occurred or was rea-
sonably likely to occur.
228. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1058 n.13 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J.,
concurring).
229. See id. ("Possibly the traditional standard of the law that holds a person responsi-
ble of the natural and reasonably foreseeable consequences of his action might
have some pertinent applicability to the issue."). Notably, this circumstance is
rarely, if ever, mentioned by the courts deciding student cyberbullying cases; in-
stead, the courts continue to focus on the locale where the speech originated.
230. See Servance, supra note 6, at 1241-42.
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not undermine the practical realities of the situation, i.e., student In-
ternet speech originating within a cyberbully's home or from his cell
phone can, and often does, cause a disruption in the school environ-
ment.23 1 In fact, absent the school environment, there would often be
no impetus for creating the bullying material. The correct result can
only be reached-especially in light of the special circumstances of the
school environment 232-when balancing the value of the cyberbully's
speech against the intrusion upon the rights of the others involved,
usually other students and the teachers. 2 33
Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport Central School Dis-
trict,23 4 for example, upheld discipline imposed upon an eighth grader
for instant messaging in which he portrayed and suggested the killing
of his English teacher.2 35 Wisniewski held that the messaging
"crosse[d] the boundary of protected speech and constitute[d] student
conduct that.., would 'materially and substantially disrupt the work
and discipline of the school."' 2 36 Had Wisniewski focused on the origi-
nation of the speech, a different result might have been dictated. Wis-
niewski emphasizes the fallacy of ignoring such realities and
pretending as if the student's rights are no longer subject to school
discipline when the student exits the schoolhouse. If students know
their conduct is subject to such a rigid rule, cyberbullying may very
well increase because students know their conduct will not be subject
to discipline except in those rare cases where schools can establish an
actual disruption. 23 7 Because such speech is of such little social value
and adds nothing to the "marketplace of ideas"238 protected by the
First Amendment, courts should not hesitate to analyze such speech
as what it is-that of cowardly persons who seek to disparage others
through sometimes anonymous, hurtful Internet websites. 23 9
Just as the analysis of whether student speech is subject to disci-
pline should not turn upon which side of the door the speech
originated, courts must not forget that the effects of cyberbullying ex-
tend well beyond the schoolyard. Certainly, students do not forget
231. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (2002).
232. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
233. See supra notes 199-207 and accompanying text.
234. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007).
235. See id. at 37-39.
236. Id. at 38-39 (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2625 (2007)).
237. See, e.g., Mahaffey ex rel. Mahaffey v. Aldrich, 236 F. Supp. 2d 779, 786 (E.D.
Mich. 2002) (failing to analyze the likelihood of disruption, even though student's
web site contained information suggesting possible threats to others within the
school environment).
238. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
239. Perhaps the Danish philosopher, Soren Kierkegaard, best explained the
cyberbully seeking protection under the First Amendment when he said: "People
demand freedom of speech as compensation for the freedom of thought which
they seldom use."
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about their school day when they exit the building and being subjected
to continued ridicule and harassment at school has serious effects
upon their mental and emotional development.240 Ironically, the ef-
fects of such cyberbullying could cause these students to refrain from
participating in other activities, 2 4 1 thereby further diminishing the
"marketplace of ideas."2 42 Furthermore, when the student or teacher
leaves the schoolhouse and retreats to home, the effects of the
cyberbullying impact others within their home, sometimes in quite
unfortunate ways. 24 3 Given the "borderless" nature of the In-
ternet, 244 the targets face this bullying not only at school, but they
also face the real possibility of facing the unwelcome speech within
their own homes. Being harassed at home can destroy the security of
a place where children [and teachers] should feel the safest. 24 5 En-
couraging cyberbullies by incorrectly affording them First Amend-
ment protection only exacerbates the otherwise obvious effects of
cyberbullying.
240. See, e.g., National Crime Prevention Council, Cyberbullying (2008) http://www.
ncpc.org/topics/by-audience/parents/bullying/cyberbullying ("Victims of cyberbul-
lying may experience many of the same effects as children who are bullied in
person, such as a drop in grades, low self-esteem, a change in interests, or depres-
sion."); Reuters, Bullying Harms Kids' Mental Health: Study, Feb. 6, 2008, http://
www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSCOL67503120080206 ("Bullied chil-
dren are known to be more likely to have anxiety, depression and thoughts of
suicide, as well as to experience social isolation .... Having such problems early
in life increases a person's future risk of depression and anxiety disorders.").
241. See Cara J. Ottenweller, Note, Cyberbullying: The Interactive Playground Cries
for a Clarification of the Communications Decency Act, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1285,
1292-93 (2007) ("Similar to the effects of typical schoolyard bullying, children
may experience dropping grades, low self-esteem, loneliness, a change in inter-
ests, depression, an urge to drop out of school, and suicidal tendencies."); see also
Chris Webster, What is Cyberbullying, Jul. 28, 2008, http://www.cyberbullying.
info/resources/whatis.pdf ("'Cyberbullying has the same insidious effects as any
kind of bullying, turning children away from school, friendships, and in tragic
instances, life itself . . . [m]ost victims, however, suffer shame, embarrassment,
anger, depression and withdrawal.") (citation omitted).
242. See supra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Abbot Koloff, States Push For Cyberbullying Controls, USA TODAY, Feb.
6, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-06-Cyberbullying-N.htm;
see also MA.NKE, supra note 25, at 6 ("[C]hildren who both bully others online and
are themselves the victims of cyberbullying are in the greatest need of interven-
tion and services. These youth manifest the highest levels of depression and be-
havior problems such a[s] vandalizing property, stealing, and drinking.")
(emphasis omitted).
244. See supra notes 212-15 and accompanying text.
245. See Ottenweller, supra note 241, at 1295; see also National Crime Prevention
Council, Cyberbullying (2008) http://www.ncpc.orgltopics/by-audience/parents/
bullying/cyberbullying (noting that "being bullied at home can take away the
place children feel most safe").
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C. Territoriality Is Irrelevant When Analyzing Student
Speech, as well as Remedies
The fallacy underlying the courts' continued use of the schoolhouse
gate as the demarcation point from which to determine whether
speech is protected is easily exposed. Most, if not all, champions of the
First Amendment would likely agree that the character of most speech
depends upon the circumstances in which it is uttered,246 and there
can be no question that the speech rights of school students are not
coextensive with those of adults in different settings.24 7 As Justice
Holmes stated many years ago in one of the most famous First
Amendment quotations found in jurisprudence 2 4S discussing excep-
tions to the First Amendment, even "[t]he most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a thea-
tre and causing a panic."2 49 If the same heckler were not present at
the theater but, in any event, called in a bomb threat 2 50 causing the
246. See Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
247. Corales v. Bennett, 488 F. Supp. 2d 975, 981 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (citing Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)); see also Cuff v. Valley Central
Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at
682) (stating that "it is ... clear that students in public schools enjoy a more
limited form of First Amendment protection than do adults in society at large")
(emphasis supplied).
248. See, e.g., Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 772 (5th Cir. 2007)
(citing to Schenk and stating that "[wihen a student threatens violence against a
student body, his words are as much beyond the constitutional pale as yelling
'fire' in a crowded theater"); Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d
339, 356 (Cal. 2007) (failing to cite Schenk, but making statement in analysis
that such speech is not protected); Minnesota v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 15 (Minn.
1990) (omitting cite to Schenk, same reference as Lemen); Jamshidnejad v. Cen-
tral Curry Sch. Dist., 108 P.3d 671, 677 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (omitting cite to
Schenk, but explaining that "'[t]he exercise of appropriate discipline to deter dis-
ruptive forces within the school environment is as consistent with First Amend-
ment rights as are constitutional limitations on free speech in other
environments, such as constraints on yelling 'Fire!' in a crowded movie theater'")
(quoting Pangle v. Bend-Lapine Sch. Dist., 10 P.3d 275, 286 (Or. Ct. App. 2000)).
249. Schenk, 249 U.S. at 52.
250. Beyond the breadth of this argument is an in-depth discussion of the "true
threat" doctrine. In Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), the Supreme
Court recognized that threats of violence fall within the realm of speech that the
government can prescribe without offending the First Amendment. Although the
United States Courts of Appeals differ on whether the threat is evaluated from
the perspective of the speaker or the recipient, all agree that the threat must be
viewed objectively in order to determine if it is a "true threat." See Doe v. Pulaski
County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 622-23 (8th Cir. 2002) (discussing diver-
gent views among the circuits and the "true threat doctrine"); Lovell ex rel. Lovell
v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 371-73 (9th Cir. 1996). The "true
threat" doctrine has been applied in cases of student speech posted on the In-
ternet, as well as some cases have allowed students to be disciplined in cases
where student expression on the Internet poses a serious, or a "true threat" to a
person or group. See, e.g., Latour v. Riverside Beaver Sch. Dist., No. 05-1076,
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same panic with the same theater goers, his speech would still not be
protected by the First Amendment. 2 5 1 Just the same, speech that con-
stitutes bullying and harassment, if it took place on the school play-
ground, would probably not enjoy First Amendment protection. 252
Consequently, just as the theater heckler cannot cloak his worthless
speech with First Amendment protection by using the telephone to
voice his threat instead of being present, so too the cyberbully should
not be afforded First Amendment protection just because his or her
speech originates outside of the schoolhouse, particularly when the
cyberbully intends the speech not only to penetrate the school's walls,
but to have the injurious effects and cause the material disruptions
there that Tinker expressly prohibits. 25 3 Both the bomb threat and
cyberbully cause harm; the only real difference is that the latter harm
is caused by someone who undoubtedly has more limited First Amend-
ment rights in the school setting, in an environment where even the
Supreme Court has limited the protection afforded to speech with lit-
tle to no social value.2 54 Since cyberbullying has little to no social
value, it should not be protected;255 if allowing discipline over this
type of speech in the schools avoids one serious incident, the scales are
2005 WL 2106562 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2005). It is certainly not inconceivable that
some cyberbullying rises to the level of a true threat, and is therefore not pro-
tected by the First Amendment on those grounds as well. In any event, an exten-
sive discussion of the "true threat" doctrine is beyond the application of Tinker
and the traditional analysis to such speech, and that discussion is therefore best
left for another day.
251. See, e.g., United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 396 (10th Cir. 1999); United
States v. Popa, 187 F.3d 672, 679 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Randolph, J., concurring);
Jackson v. Delaware, 821 A.2d 881, 884 (Del. 2003); State ex rel. RT, 781 So. 2d
1239, 1245 n.9 (La. 2001).
252. See Svedberg v. Stamness, 525 N.W.2d 678, 684 (N.D. 1994) (affirming lower
court's issuance of restraining order preventing child from taunting and harass-
ing another juvenile and supporting conclusion by noting that, on facts of this
case, "incessant teasing" and harassment constituted fighting words not pro-
tected by First Amendment); see also Colleen Creamer Fielkow, Note, Bullies,
Words, and Wounds: One State's Approach In Controlling Aggressive Expression
Between Children, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 1057, 1078-83 (1997) (discussing various
aspects of bullying behavior and conduct).
253. But see Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied 544 U.S. 1062 (2005) (characterizing speech as "off-campus" when
drawing was completed at home, stored for two years, never intended to be
brought to campus, and student "took no action that would increase the chances
that his drawing would find its way to school").
254. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986); Wisniewski v.
Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 37-40 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing more limited applica-
tion of First Amendment in school environment and discussing that school au-
thorities have "significantly broader" authority to sanction student speech than
the Watts standard allows).
255. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
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further tipped in favor of deferring to school authorities as to how the
schools should be operated.
25 6
Some commentators have contended that targets of cyberbullies
have adequate civil and criminal remedies outside of the school disci-
pline context and that, therefore, the schools should not step in to pro-
tect the targets of a cyberbully. 2 57 This position ignores the issue-
the need for discipline in the school.258 Requiring school officials to
defer to the courts does nothing to prevent disruption within the
schools. Given the time that such cases take to materialize and to
end, the disruption-one that likely could have been avoided if swift
discipline were allowed without fear of it being overturned later-is
immediate and the option of resorting to the court system is at best,
largely ineffective. Deferring to the civil and criminal justice system
and examining incidents of cyberbullying from this perspective also
ignores the actual impact that cyberbullying has on those involved.
For example, allowing tort remedies for Ryan Halligan's parents will
hardly compensate them for their loss, especially when viewed in the
context of whom the defendant(s) would be. 259 Moreover, even if a
teacher or fellow student succeeds in bringing a defamation claim or
an invasion of privacy claim, how will the school environment benefit
from the disruption injected by the likely judgment-proof cyberbully
when his or her underlying speech went without discipline? It will
not.
Civil remedies, and even criminal or juvenile court proceedings,
are often inadequate 260 to compensate the target or their loved ones
for all of the damage and hurt that some cyberbullies have perpe-
trated.2 6 1 Such a stance ignores the realities of the situation insofar
as those civil remedies fail to provide any cure for the insurrection
within the school corridors-some of which may rise to the level of
actually depriving students and teachers alike of their rights within
256. See Servance, supra note 6; see also Texarkana Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lewis, 470
S.W.2d 727, 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) ("Except in extreme cases the judgment of
school officials should be final in applying a regulation to a given case.").
257. See Calvert, supra note 29, at 245.
258. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
259. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
260. The inadequacy of criminal proceeding in cyberbullying cases was also explored
in Megan Meier's case. After carrying on an online relationship with Megan, pos-
ing as a young boy, and already having knowledge of Megan's depression and
vulnerable psyche, Lori Drew told Megan Meier that the world would be a much
better place without her. After Megan committed suicide, Drew was convicted
only of minor offenses of unauthorized access of a computer. Scott Glover, Jury
Delivers Mixed Verdict in MySpace Bullying Trial, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 27, 2008,
available at http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/front/la-me-myspace-trial-
verdict27-2008nov27,0,5931636.story.
261. Compare Erb, supra note 8, at 276-80, with Calvert, supra note 29, at 245.
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the school environment. 26 2 As such, the proper focus for one seeking
to alleviate cyberbullying within the school hallways is not to resort to
the tort system, but to resort to the framework provided by the Su-
preme Court over the last forty years and allow teachers and school
administrators to discipline students for behavior-speech or other-
wise-that is likely to and usually does materially disrupt the educa-
tional environment. 2
6 3
VI. CONCLUSION
First Amendment rights are different in public schools than any-
where else. 26 4 Even outside of the school context, the First Amend-
ment right to freedom of speech is not absolute.2 65 By recognizing the
limitless reach of the Internet and allowing school authorities broad
discretion in disciplining students for off-campus websites and
cyberbullying that disrupts the school environment or has a reasona-
ble probability of doing so, courts would simultaneously be protecting
students and teachers from undue harassment and allowing schools to
resume their roles as those who must effectuate what is best for the
school environment. 2 66 Educators are expected to inculcate our young
people with "habits and manners of civility," including a "considera-
tion of the sensibilities of others,"2 6 7 but courts routinely second-guess
their decisions as to how that inculcation should be administered.
2 68
During that process, courts often lose sight of the balancing called for
by the Court's opinion in Tinker, and many decisions are therefore
hastily decided, by focusing, in large part, upon the geographic loca-
tion where the cyberbullying originated.
Cyberbullying cases should be analyzed under the balancing
framework provided in Tinker and its progeny. In assessing the im-
pact that the nearly worthless expression that is cyberbullying has
upon the school environment as well as upon the participants in that
environment, courts must resist placing educators in the proverbial
catch-22 of having to choose between protecting the educational mis-
sion in the school and the rights of the targets of such speech and
risking liability for violation of the cyberbully's First Amendment
262. See supra notes 192-95 and accompanying text.
263. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
264. Vernonia Sch. Dist. No. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995).
265. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 521-22 (Black, J., dissenting) ("It is a myth to say that
any person has a constitutional right to say what he pleases, where he pleases,
when he pleases. Our Court has said exactly the opposite.").
266. See Erb, supra note 8, at 276-80.
267. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
268. See, e.g., Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 496 F. Supp. 2d 587, 600 (W.D. Pa.
2007); Killion v. Franklin Reg'l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 454 (W.D. Pa.
2001); Beussink ex rel. Beussink v. Woodland R-LV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d
1175, 1177 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
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rights.269 Conducting a rigid analysis based upon where the speech
originated, instead of considering all of the rights involved-including
those of targeted students and teachers-disregards Tinker's balanc-
ing test and creates an inflexibility not conducive to analyzing the In-
ternet and its potential disruptive impact within the schools.
Certainly, Americans have the right to "criticize . . . and that
means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to
speak foolishly and without moderation."270 When that criticism in-
vades the schoolhouse, however, berating teachers and fellow stu-
dents, causing a material disruption to the educational mission, and
infringing upon students' and teachers' rights, courts must remain
aware that "[t]he education of the Nation's youth is primarily the re-
sponsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials,
and not of federal judges."2 71 Consequently, when confronted with
First Amendment challenges to school disciplinary action imposed as
a result of a cyberbully's intrusion upon those fundamental principles,
courts must be mindful that "[t]o elevate such impertinence to the sta-
tus of constitutional protection [is] farcical and would indeed be to
'surrender control of the American public school system to public
school students."'27 2 In such cases, "those who run public schools
should be the judges,.., not the courts. The quicker judges get out of
the business of running schools, the better."273
269. Kosse, supra note 164, at 906.
270. Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 674 (1944).
271. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988).
272. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 526 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting)).
273. Texarkana Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971);
see also Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (recognizing broad degree
of control afforded educators in operating nation's schools so long as decisions are
made consistent with the Constitution).
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